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Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism1 
 
(Penultimate draft. Final version forthcoming at the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie) 
 
 
In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral 
education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating 
freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both 
provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account 
actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We 
argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral 
education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both. 
 




Recently, there has been a surge of excellent work on moral education in Kant. In this paper, we 
draw attention to important tensions between Kant’s commitment to the importance of moral 
education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that transcendental 
idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, 
but also to confirm that his own account actually works. While these problems might make it look 
like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, we 
argue that there is a way in which he can maintain both. 
We begin by outlining moral education in Kant (§1). We then sketch the basic contours of 
transcendental idealism (§2), focussing on Kant’s account of (transcendental) freedom, which is 
outside of time and experience.  Having done this, we turn to the tensions between Kant’s account of 
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freedom and his account of moral education (§3). We focus upon metaphysical and epistemic 
problems for Kant: The metaphysical problem is that, in locating freedom outside of time and 
experience, Kant is unable to offer a satisfying explanation of how education works. The epistemic 
problem is that, in locating freedom outside of experience, Kant is unable to confirm that his own 
account of moral education does in fact work. In the final section (§4), we then consider a way in 
which Kant could mitigate this. We claim that Kant could accept that transcendental idealism 
precludes him from providing an explanation of how education works and confirming that his own 
account works, but that nevertheless, still maintain that his is the only account that could work, and 
have faith and hope that it might. 
 
I. Moral Education 
Older Kant literature tends to neglect – or even dismiss – Kant’s conception of moral education.2 
Recently, however, moral education has received a surge of attention.3 In this section we firstly lay 
out the various ways in which education is important for Kant’s ethics. And secondly, we provides 
an overview of the different forms of education that we can find in Kant.  
Education, moral and otherwise, is undoubtedly important to Kant. In the Pedagogy, he claims 
that education is the source of all good in the world (IX:448.12–17)4, and that education is what turns 
animals into human beings (IX:441.1–23, 443.19-20). Human beings need education to be in a 
position to make use of their rational capacities in the first place (see IX:441.1-23, 443.19-20), and 
they have to be “educated to the good” (VII:325.5–11). In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims 
that parents are blameworthy and can even be punished if they fail to educate their children 
                                                        
 
 
2 Relatively recently Herman (2007, 132 and 152-3) still has objected that Kant’s ethics lacks anything that could be 
understood as training for autonomous agency. Furthermore, Grenberg in her book on Kant and common moral experience 
only dedicates a single page to the issue of education. She acknowledges that “some basic education and some protection 
from external threats” is required “to realize one’s human capacities”. If these conditions are not fulfilled one could not 
hold “persons fully responsible for their actions” (ibid.282). We doubt that for Kant agents without any education will be 
rational enough to be subject of any deserved blame (or even of reduced blame). 
3 Recent literature on Kant and education includes: Munzel (2002; 2012), Koch (2003), Baron (2009), Moran (2009; 2012, 
ch.3), Surprenant (2010), Louden (2011, ch.11), Sweet (2011), Giesinger (2012), the essays in Roth, Surprenant (2012), 
and in Roth, Gustafsson, Johansson (2014), Vanden Auweele (2015), Sticker (2015), Cohen (2015), and Wehofsits (2016). 
For the historical context of Kant’s conception of education see Munzel (1999, 254-74; 2012, ch.1-2), Moran (2012, 130-
42).  
4 It should be noted that Kant's Pedagogy is not a text that Kant himself wrote and published, but rather a text put together 
by another person, Friedrich Theodor Rink, on the basis of Kant’s notes for his lectures on the topic. Discussion of the 
authenticity of the Pedagogy can be found in Weisskopf (1970), Beck (1979, 14–8), and Stark (2000, 97–101). In what 




(VI:281.13–19).5 Moreover, in the Groundwork, he motivates the introduction of different formulae 
of the Categorical Imperative by pedagogical concerns: the different formulae bring the Categorical 
Imperative closer to intuition, and help the moral law to obtain access to an agent’s mind (IV:437.1–
4).  
There is a second sense in which education is important for Kant, and this second sense is less 
obvious and often neglected in the literature, even though it is important for his practical philosophy 
and the way he engages his critics. Education is not only important for moral improvement, but it also 
plays a role in establishing Kant’s ethical theory and setting it apart from competing theories. We can 
see this when Kant addresses criticism by the popular philosopher Johann Georg Sulzer. Sulzer 
challenged Kant to explain why all practical philosophy so far has failed to morally improve agents. 
Kant replies (in a footnote in the Groundwork) that doctrines of virtue so far have achieved little, 
because moral educators present a multitude of purported good motives, or a mixed doctrine, instead 
of actions that abstract from all “advantage” and “alien incentives” (IV:411fn).6 He suggests that the 
“most common observation” shows that: 
 
[…] when one represents an action of righteousness – as it was performed with a steadfast soul, without aiming 
at any advantage [...] it elevates the soul and stirs up the wish to be able to act like that too. Even children of 
intermediate age feel this impression (IV:411fn).  
 
Presenting an example of action done for the sake of duty, Kant claims, will affect rational 
agents, and even children, and they will react in a way that nothing but duty presented in its full purity 
can bring about. Kant suggests that the way the child expresses or describes her feelings when 
presented with the moral law in its full purity will support his ethical system over popular contenders, 
since the child's reaction shows that the supreme principle of Kant’s theory can move agents in ways 
nothing else can and that this is the only basis for moral improvement. Kant proposes that his theory, 
if properly presented, affects and moves rational agents. 
In the final section of this paper, we will return to consider this claim in more detail. There we 
will disambiguate between a weak and a strong reading of what Kant claims in the Sulzer footnote 
(and other similar passages). This disambiguation will turn out to make a big difference for the 
                                                        
 
 
5 See also V:151.8-12, 152.19-153.12, 162.24-163.35, VIII:26.22-36, IX:446.1-18, 450.27-451.2, 480.7-481.15, and 
XV:647-8, 779 for further passages that stress the importance of education. 
6 See VIII:287.22-288.18. For Kant’s emphasis on a pure representation of the moral law as a foundation of education, 




success of Kant’s account of moral education. For now, however, we want to continue to say 
something about how Kant understands moral education. 
Kant discusses four different kinds of education.  
Firstly, there is technical education in which children are trained to achieve their ends in 
efficient ways, how to interact with people for their own good and the good of their community, and 
which prepares them to become “useful” members of society (see IX:441.1–23, 443.19-20, 448.12–
7). This education is not moral education, since it does not aim at developing or training autonomy 
(in Kant’s sense). In technical education, children are brought to develop general skills such as means-
ends reasoning, as well as learning the habits and norms of the specific culture they live in. Some of 
this might prepare them for autonomous agency, but many of the culturally transmitted norms rather 
regulate the realm of the morally permissible.7  
Secondly, a genuine form of moral education is the kind of education it takes to become a moral 
agent in the first place. We can call this basic moral education. Unfortunately, Kant says relatively 
little about it. In his ethics, he really only addresses agents who have already completed the transition 
to full agency and whose commitment to duty must now be strengthened.8 The reason for largely 
neglecting basic moral education might be that its aim is to facilitate a special self-relation, namely, 
the transition to a state of autonomy.9 Completing his transition is ultimately left to the agent herself, 
and at bottom, “inscrutable” (VI:138.19, see also VI:280.23-5).10 This appeal to inscrutability is 
important, and we will return to discuss it in more detail in section III. 
Whilst Kant says little about basic moral education, it is important to bear in mind that he is not 
committed to the bizarre view that human beings develop rational capacities automatically and 
regardless of all external factors. Of course, moral agency is not something that must be taught in 
                                                        
 
 
7 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant, however, declares that being “a useful member of the world” is a duty to self 
(VI:446.1-2). In this sense even non-moral education has an effect on morality. See Moran (2012, 143–54) for an overview 
of Kant’s conception of non-moral education. 
8 See, for instance, the Metaphysics of Morals Catechism in which a teacher engages a young pupil for the purpose of 
moral education. It is important that this catechism is “developed from ordinary human reason” (VI:479.7) and that the 
pupil is said to already be aware that duty is “an unconditional necessitation through a command (or prohibition) of reason, 
which I must obey; and in the face of it all my inclinations must be silent” (VI:481.31-36). Even the pupil who receives 
this relatively basic catechistic instruction is already an agent aware of the authority of duty and able to exercise her pure 
reason. 
9 By a “state of autonomy” we mean one in which an agent is under the moral law, i.e., aware of the requirements of duty 
and in principle able to act on her moral judgements without external incentives. Such an agent might still act immorally.   
10 Vanden Auweele (2015, 374) has recently argued that Kant believes that it is not “necessary for the moral law to be 
taught”. This is correct, but, and this is an important “but”, acquiring use of one’s pure practical reason requires a basic 
form of education and the moral law is only accessible to those who can make use of pure practical reason. Hence the 




universities or by experts. It is acquired as part of a normal upbringing that all agents, except those in 
extreme circumstances, undergo (see VI:281.13-19). At the beginning of the Religion, Kant expresses 
the belief that many of his philosophical distinctions are “in different words” contained in the “most 
popular instruction for children or in sermons, and easily understood” (VI:13.30–14.15). The 
common use of rational capacities is acquired through education and the educational means to help 
someone acquire it are relatively easily accessible and wide-spread.11 
Since basic moral education is a central aspect of our paper, we will attempt to reconstruct this 
crucial part of education as well as we can, based on what little Kant does say about the transition to 
moral agency. Since basic moral education starts with a pupil who can use practical reason only in 
empirical practical ways, no moral insights on behalf of the pupil can be presupposed. Education must 
therefore operate via an agent’s self-interest and fear of harm (V:152.21-2). Basic education initiates 
and guides a transformation from a pupil who first becomes aware that she has the capacity to use 
reason not only in an empirical practical way to an agent who can assess morally relevant cases 
according to universal standards and act on these assessments. For this purpose, external rules are 
enforced via rewards, threats, and punishments, and conformity to rules becomes a “habit” 
(IX:475.27).  
The most comprehensive account of the process of basic education is provided in the pre-critical 
Kaehler Lecture Notes. A youth [Jüngling] of approximately 10 years is already able to employ their 
reason at least in a prudential (empirical practical) sense, and hence can, for self-interested reasons, 
conform to rules. Such a youth is subject to external rules, such as parental prohibitions and 
expectations. From subjection to and familiarity with external rules enforced by his parents and other 
adults, a youth gains more abstract concepts such as “decency”, “philanthropy”, and “principle” 
(Kaehler Lectures, p.363).  
There is disagreement in the literature as to when Kant developed and introduced his conception 
of autonomy.12 If it is introduced earlier than the Groundwork, as it is for instance argued by Karl 
Ameriks (2012, ch.2), then the Kaehler passage can be applied to Kant’s critical practical philosophy 
without accounting for substantial changes in Kant’s fundamental views. Even if the Kaehler Lecture 
Notes from the mid-1770s do not reflect Kant’s mature conception of autonomy, they are not without 
value, as their starting point is the same as in Kant’s critical period: a young person who begins to 
                                                        
 
 
11 See also Moran (2012, 162-3) who argues that the kind of education that is supposed to facilitate the development of 
moral agency is so basic that almost all human beings will undergo it.  
12 The term “autonomy” is used by Kant the first time in lecture notes immediately preceding the publication date of the 




use her reason and who has the potential to moral agency. Subjection to external constraints, 
experienced in basic education, makes a child familiar with abstract moral concepts.13 Through her 
subjection to universal standards, the agent learns to consider cases in the light of universal standards 
and not only in the light of what would be of personal benefit. This ultimately enables the agent to 
make non-self-interest-based decisions and shows her that her reason does not always have to be in 
the service of inclinations.14 In Kant’s pre-autonomy conception, moral feeling plays the role of the 
moral incentive whereas in his developed conception respect for the moral law plays this role.  
Before we move on to the kind of education that presupposes the capacity to feel respect and 
seeks to amplify it, it should be noted that there is an important gap between the capacity to defer 
immediate satisfaction of desires for the sake of a future greater benefit (practical freedom) and the 
ability to omit or commit actions based on something other than what is of personal benefit altogether 
(transcendental freedom). (We will discuss this in more detail in sec.III.15) 
Thirdly, Kant warns that basic education might only produce a “manner of the good” 
(A/B:748/776) and even threatens to “corrupt” (IX:475.24) a pupil. It might lead a pupil to believe 
that external conformity to (parental or societal) rules in order to avoid punishment is all that is 
morally required. As seen in his reply to Sulzer, Kant sees it as one of the central problems of his 
time that educators treat rational moral agents like children who need to be bribed and scared into 
obedience to morality. Motivational education aims at strengthening an agent’s “receptivity to a pure 
moral interest” (V:152.33-35, see also A/B:829-30/857-8) with the goal of “cultivating and founding 
genuine moral dispositions”.16 Once a pupil’s reason is not solely in the service of inclinations 
                                                        
 
 
13 We stress the role of external coercion, since we are here talking about an individual who does not yet possess the 
capacity to be motivated by anything but external incentives. Kant himself clearly says that “coercion is necessary” for 
education (IX:453.30). Shapiro (1999) by contrast rather stresses the role of play for children’s development on a Kantian 
framework. La Vaque-Manty (2006) argues that Kant with his pedagogical advice aims to respect the pupil as in some 
sense already rational and autonomous. We think that this is correct, but only for pupils who are already in some sense 
autonomous. Pupils must be brought into this state first. 
14 In the third Critique, Kant calls this step “culture of training (discipline)”, which “consists in the liberation of the will 
from the despotism of desires, by which we are made, attached as we are to certain things of nature, incapable of choosing 
for ourselves” (V:432.4-8). 
15 Shapiro (1999) makes use of elements of Kant’s political philosophy for a Kantian account of becoming an adult. Her 
project differs from what we are talking about, since she is interested in how agents can “organize the fundamental 
constituents of [their] motivational world” or how they are able to live a self-determined life (ibid.730). This is rather a 
matter of empirical practical reason and her account is one that concerns the development of non-moral capacities, not of 
the transition to autonomy in the Kantian sense of the term. Since she, however, follows Korsgaard’s (1996) 
constructivism, according to which there is a transition from a prudentially well-organized will to acknowledgment of 
moral commands, these matters are in a continuity for Shapiro. We believe, in contrast to Shapiro, that the step from 
empirical practical rationality to moral agency needs extra explaining. See also Ludwig (2014) who emphasizes that at 
least since the Religion Kant acknowledges that there can be instrumentally rational agents not under the moral law (see 
VI:26.26-37). 
16 V:153.11. Kant stresses the motivational impact practical philosophy can have throughout his writings. See IV:405.2-




anymore, education should abandon the “leading string” (V:152.23) of self-interest and external 
enforcement of rules. Instead, the educator should appeal only to an agent’s newly discovered 
capacity to use reason independently of sensuous incentives (V.156.36–157.6). The “dignity” 
(IV:411.13) of morality lies in its motivational purity. It is therefore “of the greatest practical 
importance” (IV:411.18) to present the foundations of morality “pure and unmingled” (IV:411.19).  
Motivational education can take different forms: The educator can use real or fictional and stipulated 
examples to train the pupil’s assessment of cases. This helps the agent to distinguish sensuous from 
pure motives, and thus to gain a better understanding of what makes duty special as a motive 
(V:154.17-155.1, VI:48.17-33). Furthermore, an educator can present detailed examples of morally 
good conduct in adverse circumstances and discuss them with the pupil (V:155.12-157.6, VIII:286.8-
287.21). 
Presumably, this kind of education is not only of benefit to pupils who have just started to make 
use of their pure practical reason, but also to everyone else, since we, finite rational agents, do not do 
our duty automatically and always gladly. Motivational education is not simply a stage of one’s moral 
development that one can leave behind. It can and should be continuous and concurrent with the last 
form of education.17 
Fourthly, there is the “sharpening” of moral appraisal in how to “distinguish different duties” 
(V:159.22-31). This is the training of an agent’s capacity of moral judgement or his capacity to 
recognize moral situations and to correctly prioritize perfect duties over imperfect ones and to balance 
different obligatory ends the promotion of which admit of latitude. Means for this purpose could be 
the casuistical questions in the Doctrine of Virtue as well as this work’s Doctrine of Method. Both 
offer exemplary cases to train a pupil’s capacity to apply duties to concrete cases. In the Doctrine of 
Method, the Catechism as the “first and most essential instrument for teaching the doctrine of virtue” 
(VI:478.28) is of particular importance for this. The education of moral judgment is again rather a 
matter of the phenomenal side of things and much like technical education, albeit that an agent here 
is not trained in pursuing any end but specifically moral ends.18 
In summary, Kant has a developed and multi-faceted account of education. He writes of: 1) 
technical education; 2) education required to become a moral agent in the first place; 3) education 
                                                        
 
 
17 This also shows that Kant does not have in mind fixed stages for moral education. See also Guyer (2014, 5) who 
emphasizes that, contrary to how many read Kant and many of Kant’s own educational examples that concern children, 
Kant “like a true moral perfectionist, is clear that the process of moral education is never ending and never ended”. In 
addition, it is of course possible that the same means of education train both motivation and judgement at the same time.  
18 There is, at least, one other important aspect to moral development in Kant other than the forms of moral education we 




that aims at strengthening motivation; 4) and training of moral judgment. Kant thinks that education 
is important, and that his framework can provide impulses for education and can even correct 
deficient educational practices; additionally, as we saw in the Sulzer footnote, he thinks that this helps 
reveal how his philosophy is superior to other approaches. 
In the next section, we will sketch the basics of transcendental idealism, before turning to draw 
out some tensions between this and Kant’s account of moral education in section III. In this, our 
discussion will not focus on the first and fourth kind of education, but the second and third – basic 
moral education and motivational education.  
 
II. Transcendental Idealism 
Kant views experience as determined by natural necessity. Transcendental Idealism allows him to 
maintain this conception of experience, but also to accept a libertarian conception of freedom.19 It 
does so by locating freedom (in some sense20) outside of experience.21 
This position has some clear advantages. Kant has found a way to insulate freedom from the 
empirical. No matter what the natural sciences reveals about our experience, they cannot threaten 
freedom. Transcendental idealism has thus carved out a safe space for freedom – and along with it, 
morality.  
We are sympathetic to Kant’s attempt to preserve a libertarian conception of freedom, but 
acknowledge that this attempt to insulate freedom from the empirical raises problems. In what follows, 
we want to set out two aspects of Kant’s position, namely that: 1) we cannot experience freedom; and 
                                                        
 
 
undergo a conversion (stage one) or make a “single and unalterable decision” to prioritize the moral law over self-love 
and we can expect reform or progress in an agent’s empirical conduct (second stage) (VI:47.1–48.16). The latter stage 
allows agents to make a “conjecture” about their goodness (VI:68.23-4). Even though many of the problems we bring up 
in section 3 also apply to this specific form of improvement, as here once again, we find the problem of interaction 
between the empirical and the noumenal, we bracket this model and focus on moral improvement in the form of moral 
education, as opposed to improvement that simply results from the agent’s own decision without involvement of an 
educator. See instead, Papish (2018, ch.7) for a critical discussion of the two-stage model of moral improvement. She 
raises the problem of how “to explain how a person’s intelligible character is meaningfully shaped by a consideration of 
her empirical character” (ibid.189). She proposes a new interpretation of the distinction between conversion and progress 
in terms of commitment and cognitive labour to tackle this problem. This interpretation is intended to honor Kant’s 
commitment to transcendental freedom (ibid.194-5). 
19 Throughout the rest of the paper, unless otherwise specified, we will use ‘freedom’ as shorthand for ‘transcendental 
freedom’. We understand this as a contra-causal power, and hence a libertarian conception of freedom. 
20 Spatial metaphors – such as outside – are somewhat cumbersome when it comes to discussing transcendental idealism. 
Nevertheless, Kant is clear that freedom is a property of things-in-themselves, and not a property of the world of 
appearances, and thus in this sense, freedom is outside of the empirical world. 




2) freedom occurs outside of time. After doing so, we will turn to possible tensions between these 
claims and Kant’s commitment to transcendental idealism. 
Before we begin, it is worth noting that in this paper, we want to remain relatively neutral on 
how to understand the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal, as we think the tensions 
we are bringing out apply to any account of transcendental idealism. However, that being said, we 
will say something about both the metaphysical issues that moral education raises, as well as how our 
concerns also apply to a non-metaphysical two-standpoint reading of Kant.22  
 
No Experience of Freedom 
In a footnote in the first Critique, after noting that we only have immediate cognition of the world of 
appearances, Kant claims that: 
The real morality of actions (their merit and guilt), even that of our own conduct, therefore remains entirely 
hidden from us. Our imputations can be referred only to the empirical character. How much of it is to be 
ascribed to mere nature and innocent defects of temperament or to its happy constitution (merita fortunae 
[merit of fortune]) this no one can discover, and hence no one can judge it with complete justice. 
(A/B:551n/579n) 
 
We see an echo of this in the start of Groundwork II, where Kant famously claims that: 
In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case 
in which the maxim of an action that otherwise conforms with duty did rest solely on moral grounds and on 
the representation of one’s duty (IV:407.1-4) 
 
It is important to differentiate between two claims here. The first is the plausible thought that 
we can never know with “complete certainty” or judge with “complete justice” what someone’s 
maxim is. However, Kant seems to be committed to something more than this. On his set-up, it is not 
just that we cannot know with complete certainty whether someone acted for the sake of the moral 
law, but rather that we cannot know, with any degree of confidence, whether someone acted for the 
sake of the moral law. We can see this tension in the above two passages. Kant moves between the 
weaker claim that “it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete 
                                                        
 
 
22 There is now an extensive scholarly and philosophical debate about how best to interpret transcendental idealism. See 




certainty” and the stronger claim that the “real morality of actions […] remains entirely hidden from 
us”.  
His conception of experience seems to commit him to the stronger claim. We can see this in the 
preceding claim: “imputations can be referred only to the empirical character” (A 551n/B 579n). When 
it comes to experience, all we encounter are empirical characters, which are determined by natural 
necessity.23 Whether or not someone acted for the sake of the moral law is not going to show up in 
experience. This will turn out to be important for our discussion of the epistemic problem in the next 
section. 
Before we continue, we should note that there is one special exception here, namely the fact of 
reason, where I feel the moral law pull against all of my sensible inclinations.24 However, this is not 
technically experience, it is an exclusively first-personal awareness.25 When it comes to third-person 
experience, we do not encounter morality resisting sensible inclinations – we only encounter the 
world of sense, determined by natural necessity.26 
 
Freedom outside of Time 
There is an additional wrinkle here. Kant famously locates freedom outside of space and time. He 
views space and time as forms of intuition, and claims that everything in time is determined. In the 
second Critique for instance, he argues that everything in time is determined, and that freedom 
                                                        
 
 
23See IV:407, V:100; VI:51; Stang (2013, 106n9). We should note that this applies to both others and ourselves. See 
Papish (2018, 159-64) for more extensive discussion of how self-cognition concerning maxims, motives and character 
can never be fully accomplished. Papish lists a number of psychological and epistemic reasons that underlie this opacity 
in Kant’s framework. She ultimately suggests that we can only make sense of the duty to cognize ourselves and of the 
epistemic limits of self-cognition, if we adopt a broader notion of self-cognition that she calls “self-interpretation” and 
that is not focused on motivation but on assessing oneself in the light of ethically rich concepts, such as modesty, 
cowardice, etc. (ibid.ch.6). 
24 See V:29.28 –30.30. 
25 See Grenberg (2013) for an account of the exclusively first-personal nature of the fact of reason. 
26 For an extended account of this epistemological problem, see Saunders (2016). See also Sticker (2016) for an account 




therefore needs to be located outside of time (V:94.22-103.20). 27  He then refers back to what 
transcendental idealism accomplishes in the first Critique, and remarks: 
Of such great importance is the separation of time (as well as space) from the existence of things in themselves 
that was accomplished in the Critique of pure speculative reason. (V:102.37- 103.2) 
 
This has been quick, but hopefully two keys points are clear. Transcendental idealism makes freedom 
possible for Kant, but also commits him to claiming that we cannot experience someone acting for 
the sake of the moral law, and that freedom is located outside of time. 
 
III. Tensions 
Having now laid out some of the very basics of Kant’s account of moral education and two important 
elements of transcendental idealism, we want to now turn to some tensions between these 
commitments. 
We think that Kant’s locating freedom outside of time and experience causes a number of 
problems for his account of moral education.28 These problems are specific cases of a much more 
general issue, namely, that it is difficult to reconcile transcendental idealism with anything that 
requires interaction between the empirical and the noumenal (cognition, synthesis, ethical decision 
making, etc.). Some of the problems we bring up might generalize and represent tensions between 
                                                        
 
 
27 Here it is worth noting that the mental is in time (but not space). So conceived, deliberation, decisions, thought, 
experience and so on, are all subject to causal determination. This is important since Grenberg (2013) recently provided 
an extensive argument for the possibility of introspective moral experience of something that reveals a noumenal cause. 
We cannot discuss her proposal in detail here. We should keep in mind, though, that an introspective experience has to 
obey the same epistemic limitations as experiences of external objects. See Ware (2015) and Sticker (2016) for critical 
discussion of Grenberg. 
28 Another possible source of tension for Kant’s conception of education is that moral education is something that is done 
to an agent by external sources such as parents, teachers or institutions. This raises the issue of how external sources can 
influence an agent in a way that does not undermine her autonomy. See for instance IX:453.28-37. Beck (1960, 235; 1979, 




transcendental idealism and Kant’s ethics more generally, but in this paper, we focus on tensions 
pertaining to moral education.  
In what follows, we consider the metaphysical and epistemic problems that Kant’s locating 
freedom outside of time and space causes. 
 
The Metaphysical Problem 
The metaphysical problem is relatively straightforward. Kant’s idea of basic moral education suggests 
that things done in the empirical world can affect whether or not someone is transcendentally free. 
This also suggests that we gain transcendental freedom over time, which would conflict with Kant’s 
insistence that transcendental freedom is outside of time. The idea of motivational education in turn 
seems to imply that things done in the empirical world affect the noumenal subject, in particular, how 
effectively the moral law motivates an agent.  
Here we can return to the basic issue we mentioned in section one, namely that transcendental 
idealism makes it mysterious how a child could transition to an agent. On this topic, Claudia Blöser 
claims that “[t]he transition from child to full person is beyond any empirical explanation” (Blӧser 
2015, 205). Of course though, we have some empirical explanations of how children develop into full 
persons or agents – we agree with Kant’s account of basic moral education that it involves other 
agents (such as parents or educators), a certain amount of habituation and external pressure, 
socialization and learning abstract notions such as rules. The question is, however, how Kant could 
accommodate this, given that he locates transcendental freedom outside of experience, space and time. 
There is both a general and a specific issue here. The general issue concerns the large and 
fundamental topic of interaction or affection between the empirical and the noumenal.  
Kant believes to have addressed this issue sufficiently at least for moral actions. Morally worthy 
actions are events in the causally determined world, which are motivated by respect for the moral law. 
Respect for the moral law is a feeling and as a feeling part of the causal world, but it is a feeling that 
is self-wrought [“selbstgewirkt” (IV:401fn.)] and originates in reason or in the intelligible. In the 
Second Critiques’ Incentive Chapter (V:71-89), Kant provides an extensive explanation for how 
reason can motivate agents to actions in the phenomenal world.  
However, even if we accept Kant’s conception of moral motivation, this does not yet solve the 
problem at hand. A child who is not yet a moral agent presumably lacks the feeling of respect (though 
it might, in some sense, already have a capacity to experience it). On Kant’s framework the child is, 
so to speak, stuck entirely in the phenomenal world. The goal of basic moral education is to assist an 




the sake of obtaining a greater good than satisfaction of this desire to someone who can abstract from 
all desires for the sake of duty alone. To understand moral education we would need a story about 
how the phenomenal can influence or affect the noumenal. And it is not clear how Kant could deliver 
such a story. In fact, it is telling that Kant dedicates almost 20 pages of his second Critique to a 
detailed discussion of how the noumenal or pure practical reason can become practically effective 
and considers this the most important question of this work, but does almost entirely neglect to explain 
how phenomenally imparted content can shape or influence the noumenal in any way. A satisfying 
account of moral education would require both: A story about how anything phenomenal can foster 
autonomous willing and how this willing can become effective in the world of experience. 
At this point, there might be an easy reply to our criticism: Maybe educators or other agents are 
not needed at all for becoming a moral agent. After all, we thus far only spoke of possible ways 
education can assist the crucial transition to moral agency. Maybe this assistance is superfluous. 
Nothing we have said so far shows that it is impossible for children to become full moral agents and 
for fully developed rational agents to become morally better. Maybe in the case of basic education 
this is something that just happens (and we cannot understand how), and in the case of motivational 
education it happens as a result of an agent’s work on her own character and without any external 
influence.29  
Whilst this would leave Kant’s notion of agency intact, it would be a major problem for his 
conception of moral education, since it would leave Kant in a position where he cannot tell us why 
basic moral education is needed at all.30 As the Sulzer footnote shows, Kant himself thinks that his 
                                                        
 
 
29 As noted (fn.18), moral improvement can, according to Kant, occur simply as the result of a “single and unalterable 
decision” (VI:47.37-48.1), and could be inspired or fostered by other means than another agent or educator, for instance, 
through the experience of the feeling of the beautiful and sublime. These feelings, however, presumably already 
presuppose moral agency and can thus only serve for motivational education. See Guyer (2014, sec.3) for discussion of 
these aesthetic means of moral education. Guyer (idib.23) stresses that “the moral benefit of art cannot lie in teaching us 
moral ideas that we have not previously had, since the central ideas of morality are all a priori and available to us as soon 
as we reflect on a proposed action”. Furthermore, Roth (2014, sec.2) suggests that moral education can also be a matter 
of “taking control of our conceptions of the world, others, and ourselves and our responses to them; and this we do when 
we comply with the principles of practical reason”, i.e., it does not necessarily require someone who engages a pupil with 
the intention to morally educate her. Still, even if moral improvement were something not resulting from anyone doing 
something with the intention of educating, we can wonder how this is possible, according to a framework that 
distinguishes between a level of appearances, on which human beings can affect each other, and a level that is beyond the 
causal sphere. One conception that would avoid these problems is Papish’s (2018, ch.8) proposal that the ethical 
community “addresses obstacles to moral progress” (ibid.205). In particular, the ethical community can contribute to the 
cognitive dimensions of moral improvement and “mitigate a problem regarding discordant moral judgments” (ibid.). This 
aid for moral improvement, however, only applies to what Papish identifies as the second, cognitive stage of moral 
improvement and leaves open whether and how other agents, educators or the community can influence an agent to 
commit himself to morality in the first place. 
30 It would be difficult to see then in what sense education could be the source of all good in the world (IX:448.12–17) 




account of education is to be preferred over other proposals. He should be able to explain how 
education works such that his account can do what competing accounts fail to achieve, namely, help 
to morally improve agents. The notion that important elements of his account are inscrutable seems 
inadequate given Kant’s stress on the methodological role of education for his debate with his 
academic colleagues. We will say more about this shortly. 
The more specific issue is that typically children become agents over time, and improve 
gradually as they develop into adults. 31  Education presupposes the possibility of gradual 
improvement, which means that it occurs over time, whereas Kant locates (transcendental) freedom 
outside of time.32 Consider the following example: Immanuel Kind was not a moral agent in 2009 – 
he could not be brought to judge that he should forego any of his inclinations at all. However, things 
change. Now, in 2019, Immanuel Kind is a moral agent – he judges that he ought not to lie (when 
presented with scenarios in which it would be an option for him to further his own interest by means 
of a lie or false promise) and is convinced that it is at least possible for him to obey this prohibition. 
Immanuel Kind has changed over time. It seems that in 2009, Immanuel Kind was not under the 
moral law and now he is. This process and change in Immanuel Kind is not puzzling on an empirical 
level, since the empirical world constantly changes and we have observed the transition described in 
many individuals. On a noumenal level though, what happened to Immanuel Kind is very puzzling.  
From the perspective of transcendental idealism, it is at least in one sense awkward to say that 
a child is not yet (transcendentally) free at some point in time and free at another, later, point in time. 
As far as the noumenal is concerned, there are no points in time. A noumenal self is always free, or 
rather: temporal terms such as ‘always’ are inapplicable to it. If we take this seriously, we might get 
a very different conception of the transition from a supposedly non-free child to a free adult, namely, 
one in which the patient of education is in one sense always fully free and only her phenomenal self 
needs to be moulded such that this freedom can be exercised in the phenomenal world.33  
This view however would have very revisionary consequences for how we would have to think 
about the dead and the yet to be born. If time does not matter for freedom and freedom is what matters 
for morality, we would have the same duties to respect past and future generations as we have to 
                                                        
 
 
31 Elsewhere, Saunders (2018) argues that transcendental idealism makes it hard for Kant to provide a plausible account 
of degrees of responsibility; see Frierson (forthcoming) for a response to this.  
32 For a broader account of some of the problems caused by Kant’s claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of 
time, see Freyenhagen (2008). 
33 Guyer (2014, 21) at least implicitly endorses such a conception, when he claims that “the point of moral education is 





respect our contemporaries. Furthermore, this view would also make it difficult to understand why 
we think that children below a certain age cannot be held morally or criminally responsible for their 
actions, and why, at a very young age, their behavior does not even constitute actions. The same is of 
course true for the elderly suffering from dementia, etc. It seems that in our everyday practices 
membership in the noumenal comes with a time index and that it starts at some (possibly extended) 
point in time and might end even before we die. There can also be interruptions, such as periods of 
severe mental illness.  
A similar specific problem might apply to motivational education, depending on how we 
understand the idea of fostering motivation. Does this mean that the noumenal is monolithic and that 
only the sensuous agent is shaped by education? Even then the result is that the noumenal meets less 
resistance, can work more effectively on the agent’s sensuous side. Is that a change that is in any 
sense a change of the noumenal, or affecting the noumenal? One could respond that the metaphoric 
manner of speaking about the noumenal we are employing here makes Kant’s conception look more 
problematic than it is – for instance, we should certainly not think of the noumenal as doing anything 
at all (working on an agent or on the phenomena). However, if we want to understand how moral 
education exactly works and can be effective on Kant’s framework we have to talk about these matters 
and transcendental idealism seems to preclude Kant from doing so.  
At this point, Kant might respond that these metaphysical issues are beyond our grasp. The way 
we have discussed these problems so far violates the epistemic limits transcendental idealism imposes 
on us. Kant, as we saw, emphasizes that the ground of freedom is “inscrutable” (VI:138.19). 
According to Kant, we can cognize that we are free, since freedom follows from or can be deduced 
from morality. Freedom is hence cognizable (VI:138.16-9). The metaphysical ground of freedom, 
which could settle the question of how we come to be free, however, is “not given to us for cognition” 
(VI:138.20) and thus inscrutable.34 The result of this for thinking about education is that “it is 
impossible to form a concept of the production of a being endowed with freedom through a physical 
operation” (VI:280.23-5) or, we should add, through any operation. Once we are under the moral law, 
we can cognize our freedom, but how we get to be under the moral law in the first place is inscrutable. 
Kant cannot tell a comprehensible empirical (or other) story about it.  
Appealing to the inscrutability of freedom allows Kant to side-step the metaphysical tensions 
between transcendental idealism and his account of moral education. However, it also comes with a 
                                                        
 
 





cost. For one, if we accept that these metaphysical issues are beyond our grasp, then we seem to 
renounce a claim to provide an explanation of how moral education works. When it comes to 
questions of how freedom develops over time or how the empirical world affects the noumenal in 
education, Kant cannot provide answers. This also introduces an epistemic tension between 
transcendental idealism and moral education, to which we will shortly turn.    
Before we address this epistemic tension however, we should consider a further possible reply 
to our metaphysical objection. According to a certain reading of transcendental idealism, there is no 
metaphysical problem at all for Kant’s account of moral education, since transcendental idealism is 
not a metaphysical position. The distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal is not an 
ontological distinction between different worlds, but reflective of different standpoints on the world 
and self that rational agents can take up. On this picture, Kant cannot admit any experience of freedom, 
but that is fine. Experience concerns the theoretical standpoint, where when it comes to morality, we 
occupy the practical standpoint. And this allows us to overcome the metaphysical problems at hand, 
or to avoid them altogether.35 The basic thought is that, from the theoretical standpoint, everything 
appears determined by inclinations, but from the practical standpoint, we can observe freedom. 
However, we think that it is mistaken to assume that a two-standpoint reading is an easy fix for 
the metaphysical problem, even though this position presents a non-metaphysical reading of 
transcendental idealism. After all, what we need is a plausible story that links experience and freedom 
and there is nothing in the idea of two different standpoints (as opposed to different worlds) that 
would already on its own deliver such a story. Consider, for example, a simple case: I treat Immanuel 
Kind at age 25 differently than I do at age 4. At one of these times, Immanuel Kant is free, and at the 
other time, he is not. Now, Kant does not allow us to determine this through experience – in 
experience, we just encounter two beings determined by their inclinations. And it is not clear how the 
practical standpoint could help here. From the practical standpoint, how can we distinguish between 
Immanuel Kind at 4 and 25? It is not enough to say that we just do. This sidesteps the important issue 
of how Kant can vindicate these practices, given his conception of experience.36 The appeal to the 
practical standpoint instead merely shifts the question to: How do we know which beings can take up, 
or have taken up, the practical standpoint? Kant’s conception of experience precludes an easy answer 
to this question. The practical standpoint allows us, from the first-person, to conceive of ourselves as 
independent from the world of experience, but it does not give us a new third-personal conception of 
                                                        
 
 
35 See Korsgaard (1996, x-xi) for a brief general account of this strategy. 




experience or a new form of intuition. That would move us far beyond Kant and transcendental 
idealism. 
Moreover, the introduction of two standpoints does not help us to understand the interaction 
between the practical and theoretical, and one of the important metaphysical problems that education 
poses is the issue of interaction. At this point, the standpoint theorist could agree, but insist we merely 
have two standpoints, and are unable to get beyond them to see how freedom might influence – or 
show up in – experience.37 This takes us back to Kant’s claim that issues of interaction or affection 
are inscrutable. Again, this provides a way to side-step the metaphysical problems we are raising, but 
it comes at a cost. The more we insist upon the limits of our knowledge when it comes to freedom, 
the more we create epistemic problems for Kant’s position. On this note, we turn to the epistemic 
tensions, which affect both metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings of transcendental idealism. 
 
The epistemic problem 
Given Kant’s conception of experience, we cannot know whether other agents (or even we ourselves) 
are ever acting from duty. Since it is the point of moral education to make agents able to and better 
at acting from duty, it is difficult to determine whether any program of moral education is particularly 
successful or even adequate to the task. This problem also comes in a number of shapes: 
1) We do not know whom to educate. Saunders (2016) has recently argued that transcendental 
idealism precludes knowledge of free agents as free agents, since this would require experience of 
(transcendental) freedom in experience.38 If this is correct, the difficulty is even more pronounced for 
basic education, since here we must recognize those that can be free (but currently are not). If we 
cannot cognize noumenal properties, then how could we ever cognize potential nouemenal properties? 
One thought might be that we just try to educate all sorts of entities and see if any are responsive. But 
this requires us to be able to tell from the phenomenal world who is responsive to moral education 
                                                        
 
 
37A similar problem shows up in Allison’s (1996b, 127) criticism of Hudson (1994). Allison objects that, in offering 
compatibilist/anomalous monist readings of Kant’s theory of freedom, Hudson cannot provide a satisfying account of 
Kant’s talk of the “causality of reason”, or Kant’s worry that reason might not have causality. Allison is right that this 
counts against Hudson’s account, but it also accounts against his own non-metaphysical reading of Kant. As he himself 
acknowledges elsewhere: “Although my interpretation denies that the claim that reason has a causal power can be taken 
literally without leading to absurdity … it also leaves room for the notion that such a power can be attributed to the will 
(Willkür) of a rational agent, with the latter being itself noncausally determined (governed) by reason“ (Allison 1990, 80). 
But this only shows that it is not (conceptually or otherwise) impossible to speak of a causality of reason. What is still 
missing is a plausible account of how this is possible. For further discussion of this problem, see Ameriks (2003, 215-6). 





and who is not. Transcendental idealism precludes this knowledge. We could never know that an 
entity is able to or about to develop freedom, since, phenomenally, such an entity would not be any 
different from an entity that shares all phenomenal properties but not the capacity for freedom.  
2) We do not know what kind of education works. Kant sets out an educational program, but on 
his framework it is difficult, maybe impossible, to tell whether his program is better than other ways 
of educating. Whether Kant’s conception of education is better than competitors, or any good at all 
is settled by things which we cannot know. Furthermore, it weakens the claims he wants to make 
about which styles of education lead to moral agency if he cannot judge educational success. This 
ties into our third point.  
3) Kant cannot even be sure that education is of any use at all. If we cannot verify the success 
of education, it could be entirely redundant. This is perhaps less of a problem for basic moral 
education than it is for motivational education. After all, Kant, as we pointed out, says little about 
basic education and he seems to be confident that often or almost always this kind of education 
produces the right result: A rational agent under the moral law. Motivational education is, however, 
a matter of degree. It can be done better or worse (even so badly that its effect is counterproductive – 
as Kant suspects is the case with the proposals and practices of most of his academic colleagues and 
public educators) and Kant greatly cares about how well it is done. In fact, he thinks that a 
metaphysics of morals that presents the moral law in its full purity “is a desideratum of the highest 
importance” to encourage the “actual execution” of the prescriptions of duty (IV:410.19-25). The 
application of his theory to improve educational practices is one of the reasons why his critical 
practical philosophy is a desideratum.  
 
In summary, the metaphysical problem poses an obstacle to basic moral and motivational education, 
since: 1) it is not clear how the world of sense and transcendental freedom interact, and 2) 
transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. We should re-iterate that the first part of this problem 
applies to interpretations of transcendental idealism that pose different worlds or realms of existence, 
but also to more metaphysically parsimonious readings, since they still incur the burden to explain 
how different standpoints interact.  
The epistemic problem emerges from the epistemic limits that transcendental idealism 
imposes on finite agents like us, and this poses challenges independently of how metaphysically 




from duty, and as such, it is unclear that he can vindicate our knowledge of: 1) whom we educate; 2) 
What kind of moral education works; and 3) whether moral education is of any use at all. 
 
IV. Resolving the tension 
We will now discuss how Kant should react to the problems set out in the previous section. We will 
first discuss one way for Kant to respond that might seem promising but fails, and then present our 
own solution. 
Here is one possible way to save Kant: Perhaps moral education makes agents better at 
outwardly conforming to duty. This would not be a meaningless achievement. If everyone always 
outwardly conformed to duty, no one’s rights would be violated. Importantly, whether an agent 
outwardly conformed to duty can be cognized from observation of behaviour and hence is 
epistemically transparent to oneself and others.  
However, it is a crucial feature of Kant’s ethics that he is remarkably uninterested in mere 
conformity with the moral law.39 When Kant speaks of morally improving agents, he clearly has in 
mind that educators foster agents’ commitment to duty for the sake of duty and not for ulterior motives. 
This should encourage agents to act from the moral law and help them develop their freedom in the 
fullest sense. In addition to how Kant himself stresses that the point of moral education is not mere 
external conformity, we should bear in mind that many of the means that seem apt to further mere 
outward conformity to duty, such as the threat of punishment, differ considerably  from the 
presentation of the moral law in all its purity, that Kant envisages in his conception of motivational 
education. An increase in outward conformity could therefore be interpreted as both a step in the right 
moral direction as well as that some pathological means to incentivize mere external conformity are 
very effective, and we cannot know with certainty which of these two interpretations is the correct 
one. Thus, education that effects outward conformity will not be enough for Kant (and might even be 
harmful if it is mere conformity that is incentivized). 
A more promising way out for Kant becomes apparent when we revisit the Sulzer footnote. As 
we saw, in this footnote Kant seems to make a prediction that, if true, confirms his assumption that 
                                                        
 
 
39 See IV:397.11-2 where Kant en passant grants that most actions are in conformity with duty, but does not seem to 
believe that this shows anything very interesting about the morality of actions. In what follows and for the rest of the 
Groundwork and Second Critique, he only focuses on what makes agents morally worthy, namely, duty as an action’s 
incentive, not on how to achieve mere conformity. Matters are, however, different for Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Here 




an educational approach informed by a philosophy based on a pure principle cannot fail to morally 
improve agents. Presenting an example of action for the sake of duty alone, Kant predicts, will affect 
rational agents, and even children. Kant believes that the way a child expresses or describes his 
feelings, when confronted with the moral law in all its purity, will support his ethics over popular 
contenders, since it shows that the supreme principle of Kant’s theory can, contra Sulzer, serve for 
moral improvement.  
This claim is by no means a one-off. A similar thought occurs in the Second Critique’s Doctrine 
of Method, where Kant discusses moral education and provides some practical indications of how an 
educator should go about helping pupils develop their disposition: 
But if one asks: What, then, really is pure morality, by which as a touchstone one must test the moral 
content of every action? I must admit that only philosophers can make the decision of this 
question doubtful [1], for it is long since decided in common human reason, not indeed by abstract 
general formulae but by habitual use [2], like the difference between the right and the left hand. 
We will, accordingly, first show in an example the mark by which pure virtue is tested and, 
representing it as set-before, say, a ten-year-old boy for his appraisal, see whether he must 
necessarily judge [3] so of himself, without being directed to it by a teacher. One tells him the story 
of an honest man whom someone wants to induce to join the calumniators of an innocent but 
otherwise powerless person (say, Anne Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England). He is offered 
gain, that is, great gifts or high rank; he rejects them. This will produce mere approval and 
applause [4] in the listener's soul, because it is gain. Now threats of loss begin. […] But, so that the 
measure of suffering may be full and he may also feel the pain that only a morally good heart can 
feel very deeply, represent his family, threatened with extreme distress and poverty, as imploring 
him to yield and himself, though upright, yet with a heart not hard or insensible either to compassion 
or to his own distress; represent him at a moment when he wishes that he had never lived to see the 
day that exposed him to such unutterable pain and yet remains firm in his resolution, without 
wavering or even doubting; then will my youthful hearer be raised gradually from mere approval to 
admiration [5], from that to amazement, and finally to the greatest veneration, and a lively wish 
that he himself could be such a man (though certainly not in such circumstances). (V:155.12-156.27) 
 
Once more Kant here maintains that his ethics can be defended against doubt and criticism by 
showing that presenting a pure incentive elicits a reaction from agents that nothing else can.40 The 
way Kant introduces the example as a response to a possible challenge by an academic colleague 
(“But if one asks”) suggests that Kant also hopes to gain confirmation for his philosophy.41 He 
                                                        
 
 
40 Guyer (2014, 5) sees this passage as chief evidence that “examples of the possibility of actually living a moral life in 
the face of the inexorable imperfection of the human condition play a central role in moral education” for Kant. 
Furthermore, he stresses (ibdid.18) that “on Kant’s account, what both children and adults must learn is not the principle 
or content of morality—that, in Kant’s view, everyone, even a child, already knows—but the possibility of their own 
freedom, in particular, their freedom to be moral”. It is indeed striking that Kant’s examples of moral education are hardly 
ever examples of teaching others about concrete duties they have, but rather appeals to their better nature or to the fact 
that it is always possible to do the right thing. See Sticker (2017) for critical discussion of the underlying methodological 
assumptions Kant makes here. 
41 See Sticker (forthcoming) for an argument that Kant here seeks to support his own theory against other philosophers, 




recommends that when faced with a colleague who advocates a competing conception of morality, 
the critical philosopher involves a boy who has already gained use of his pure practical reason, but 
who is too young to have been subject to much corrupting external influence. Kant maintains that a 
criterion for morality (a “touchstone”) is already present and deeply rooted in how we ordinarily 
reason about morality [2]. Academic philosophers can overlook this and construct a system that leads 
away from this criterion ([1] see also V:35.16-17). The criterion is, however, exhibited in the boy’s 
judgements [3], as well as reactions or attitudes such as approval and applause [4] and admiration 
[5]. Common agents’ “habitual use” [2] of reason or their judgements [3] can inform the philosopher.  
Shortly before Kant presents this example of moral education, he repeats the main idea of the 
Sulzer footnote:  
We will prove, then, by observations anyone can make, that this property of our mind, this receptivity 
to a pure moral interest and hence the moving force of the pure representation of virtue, when it is duly 
brought to bear on the human heart, is the most powerful incentive to the good (V:152.32-153.1, our 
emphasis). 
 
Kant believes that he can vindicate his claims concerning the affective force of duty from observation 
of “our mind” and “the human heart”. This observation is supposedly one “anyone can make” who is 
in doubt about the de facto effect the moral law has on rational agents.42 A philosopher, however, 
might be the only one who has the theoretical understanding and sophistication to know how to “duly” 
bring the moral law to “bear on the human heart” of a corrupted agent.  
Kant believes that agents will feel admiration when they acknowledge (or think it likely) that 
an action is done from respect for the moral law and in the face of adversities. He thinks that it 
establishes the superiority of his ethics over all popular contenders that he can show that the supreme 
principle of his theory de facto affects and moves rational agents. 
It is crucial to disambiguate two versions of this claim. The first is a strong reading of the above 
passages, where Kant claims that experience can confirm that his account of moral education works 
                                                        
 
 
that a scenario be presented to a boy of eight or nine years (VIII:286) in which someone is entrusted with a deposit and 
could embezzle it without negative consequences to anyone and with very positive consequences for himself and his 
family (ibid.17-29). The boy’s response, that this would be wrong independently of consequences, is supposed to answer 
a criticism by the popular philosopher and eudaemonist Christian Garve that he cannot find in his “heart” a notion of duty 
independent of happiness (ibid.284.9-285.22). If the critical philosopher can show that the boy or a (relatively) 
uncorrupted rational agent can be brought to acknowledge the value of pure morality, then this can function as a warrant 
for his theory. 
42 See also Kant’s discussion of the humble common man (V:76.36-77.9). Kant here describes my reaction (“my spirit 
bows”) if I have reason to suspect that the humble common man is an example of good moral conduct. Kant even says 




and is the only one that works. As we have seen though, transcendental idealism precludes this; 
transcendental freedom, and acting for duty’s sake do not show up in experience. Thus, if Kant 
requires – or desires – that experience confirms that his account of moral education works, he would 
face a serious tension between his views on moral education and his commitment to transcendental 
idealism. 
However, there is also a weak reading of these passages, where Kant instead claims that his 
account of moral education is the only account that could aid the development of a genuine moral 
disposition. This makes sense given what we know about Kant’s theory of morality, namely, that we 
should act for duty’s sake. As we saw in section one, Kant worries that other theories of moral 
education – or even his own theory of basic education – might only produce a “manner of the good” 
(A/B:748/776). Again, Kant sees it as one of the central problems of his time that educators treat 
rational moral agents like children who need to be bribed and scared into obedience to morality. 
However, if we are interested in a moral education that can cultivate the ability to act for the sake of 
duty, Kant can rule out any such accounts from the start, not because he can empirically confirm that 
they fail (or that his account succeeds). 
Where does this leave Kant’s account of moral education? We think that, given his account of 
moral motivation, he can claim that his is the only account of moral education that could work. 
However, given the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism, he can neither explain how it works, 
nor confirm in experience whether in fact his account does work. He thus lacks theoretical grounds 
for his account of moral education. As we saw in the first section of this paper though, Kant thinks 
moral education should not be regarded as separated from the more abstract task of philosophical 
enquiry into the supreme principle of morality. Advising on how to educate to moral agency and to 
the good is one of the most important functions a critical ethicist can fulfil. As such, Kant could 
maintain that while we lack the ability to explain how moral education works or to confirm that his 
account works in experience, we have important practical grounds for accepting it.   
We suspect that this might be a one of those rare cases where a result pleases both (some) 
Kantians and (some of) his critics. Kant’s critics can maintain that transcendental idealism makes it 
hard for Kant to account for the metaphysical and epistemic issues that moral education raises, and 
moreover, that he is unable to confirm in experience whether or not his theory works. Kantians can 




that the working of Kant’s account of moral education ends up similar to a postulate, where we lack 
theoretical grounds for a proposition, but can rationally adopt it on practical grounds. 
This raises an interesting question, namely, what the appropriate attitude is that Kant and 
Kantians are to adopt towards Kant’s account of moral education. Before we end this paper, we want 
to briefly canvas some of the available options.  
A postulate is a theoretical proposition, for which we lack theoretical grounds, but can adopt 
on practical grounds instead (V:122.23-5). The appropriate or warranted attitude for moral agents 
towards a postulate is “pure rational faith” [reiner Vernunftglaube] (V:126.10-1). However, Kant 
requires that for finite agents such propositions be inseparably connected (V:122.24-5) to the moral 
law and the highest good; and while education is important for Kant’s practical philosophy, it is not 
clear that it stands in a necessary or inseparable connection to the moral law (or the highest good). 
After all, it seems that agents, at least once they have acquired autonomy, could in principle develop 
their character without external help, since this “only” requires unconditional commitment to duty. 
Agents can, without encouragement by an educator, make this commitment (V:36.28-37.5). 
An attitude that is in some sense similar to this rational faith is hope. Is it appropriate to hope 
for the success of Kant’s account of moral education? This question is complicated by the fact that 
Kant sometimes deploys ‘hope’ in a specific and narrow sense. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he 
claims that, “all hope concerns happiness” (A/B:805/833), and in this strict sense, hope is not the 
appropriate attitude to take towards moral education (which does not concern happiness but morality 
and worthiness to be happy). However, Kant also uses the term ‘hope’ in a broader sense,43 closer to 
our everyday usage, namely an attitude of wishing or desiring that something will come about (where 
this is not impossible).44 And this does seem like an appropriate attitude to take towards Kant’s 
account of moral education. So conceived, we cannot know how his account of moral education works, 
we also cannot know whether or not it actually does work, but we can hope that it will. Indeed, this 
                                                        
 
 
43 In the Religion, for instance, Kant discusses how we hope to make moral progress (VI:48.3-8, VI:51.16-9), and hope 
to be pleasing to God (VI:62.1-3). He also discusses hope at length in Toward Perpetual Peace (see for instance VIII:370-
1), and none of these discussions focus solely on happiness. 
44 The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘hope’ as: A feeling of expectation and desire for a particular thing to happen; Grounds 
for believing that something good may happen. A more technical and classical philosophical definition is that “‘A hopes 





hope can also be rational, in that we have practical grounds that count in favour of it (and it is not 
impossible45).  
This discussion of practical grounds that count in favour of something also connects to Kant’s 
conception of faith/belief.46 In a now famous passage in the first Critique’s Doctrine of Method, Kant 
distinguishes knowing and faith as follows:47 
If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be objectively 
insufficient, then it is called faith/belief [Glauben48] […] when taking something to be true is both subjectively 
and objectively sufficient it is called knowing [Wissen]. (A/B:822/850) 
 
If we think that objective sufficiency requires an object or objective cognition, as Kant suggests it 
does (A 821/ B 849), and transcendental idealism precludes that we can have objective cognitions 
that would prove the working of Kant’s account of moral education, then Kant cannot know whether 
his account works. Faith/Belief [Glauben] then, at least as Kant defines it here,49 also seems like an 
appropriate attitude to take towards his account of moral education.50  
This account of faith/belief connects back to Kant’s account of hope. Chignell draws this out 
well in looking at Kant’s claim that we ought to will an ethical community in the Religion. Chignell 
writes that: 
We can’t know that an ethical community is really possible, but once we see that we ought to will it, we 
have to Believe on practical grounds that it is indeed possible. This in turn licenses Belief in 
                                                        
 
 
45 Cf. Chignell (2013, 206), who claims that hope is rational only if one is in a position to know that what one hopes for 
is not really impossible. 
46 For a fuller account of practical grounds for belief, see Williams and Saunders (2018). 
47 For the classic treatment of this, see Chignell (2007). 
48 Here, we translate ‘Glauben’ as ‘faith/belief’. See Höwing (2016, 201n3) for a brief account of the complications of 
translating ‘Glauben’. 
49 It is worth noting that this definition of faith/belief is broader than Kant’s definition of pure rational faith in the Second 
Critique. 
50 One complication concerns whether Kant’s account of moral education is “only subjectively sufficient”. For a full 
account of this clause, see Höwing (2016, 201-22). Höwing (2016, 204-5) acknowledges that Kant appears to be 
ambiguous in his use of this clause, but finds this unsatisfactory. He offers a reading of the clause, which looks to remove 
the seeming ambiguity. On this reading, “only subjectively sufficient” picks out cases where a particular agent is required 
to assent to a proposition, but not every rational agent (for whom it is available) is required to assent to that proposition.   
(Höwing 2016, 218). This is an interesting suggestion, and it certainly makes sense of Kant’s claim in the Jäsche Logik 
(IX:66). However, it strikes us as? slightly ill-fitting for the case at hand. For one, it is not clear that anyone is required 
to assent to Kant’s account of moral education. And secondly, it might make the attitude a little too personal, but there 




supersensible assistance, and also underwrites rational hope for a this-worldly but still inconceivable 
goal. (Chignell 2014, 116) 
 
Kant could say something similar for moral education: We can’t know that moral education is really 
possible, but once we see that we ought to will it, we have to have faith/believe on practical grounds 
that it is indeed possible.51 This in turn licenses faith/belief in the possibility of moral education being 
successful, and also underwrites rational hope for this this-worldly goal. 
Of course, there is much more to say here. Kant’s attitudes of hope and faith/belief are 
complicated in ways that we have not addressed here. Here, we take ourselves to have briefly 
canvassed the available options and to have suggested that both hope and faith/belief might be 
appropriate in this case. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Kant has a multi-faceted account of moral education. However, in locating freedom 
outside of time and experience, transcendental idealism creates problems for this. We have considered 
what Kant can – and cannot – say about moral education, given his commitment to transcendental 
idealism. We have argued that he can neither explain how, nor confirm whether his account of moral 
                                                        
 
 
51 It appears that there is a link here between the limitations of our knowledge (that make faith possible), and Guyer’s 
(2014, 5) earlier claim that education has to be open-ended and never-ending. After all, the impossibility of noumenal 
knowledge entails that there is no point in an agent’s moral development at which she is warranted to judge that she is 
now good enough and does not need any further improvement. Even if an agent actually did not need to improve further 
(and Kant assumes that there is always room for improvement), she could not know this. We are grateful to an anonymous 




education works, but that he can still maintain that it is the only account that could work, and have 
hope and faith/belief that it does.  
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